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How the Uruguayan Judiciary Shapes Access to 
High-Priced Medicines: A Critique through the Right 
to Health Lens
lucía berro pizzarossa, katrina perehudoff, and josé castela forte
Abstract
Uruguay has witnessed an ever-increasing number of domestic court claims for high-priced medicines 
despite its comprehensive universal coverage of pharmaceuticals. In response to the current national 
debate and development of domestic legislation concerning high-priced medicines, we review whether 
Uruguayan courts adequately interpret the state’s core obligations to provide essential medicines and 
ensure non-discriminatory access in line with the right to health in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Using a sample of 42 amparo claims for the reimbursement of 
medicines in 2015, we found that the circuits of appeal fail to offer predictable legal argumentation, 
including for nearly identical cases. Moreover, the judiciary does not provide an interpretation of 
state obligations that is consistently aligned with the right to health in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These findings illustrate that medicines litigation in Uruguay 
offers relief for some individual claims but may exacerbate systemic inequalities by failing to address the 
structural problems behind high medicines prices. We recommend that the judiciary adopt a consistent 
standard for assessing state action to realize the right to health within its available resources. Moreover, 
the legislature should address the need for medicines price control and offer a harmonized interpretation 
of the right to health. These transformations can increase the transparency and predictability of 
Uruguay’s health and legal systems for patients and communities.
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Introduction
Uruguay has witnessed an ever-increasing number 
of domestic court claims for high-priced medicines 
since the dawn of its comprehensive universal 
health coverage scheme based on the right to health.1 
These cases trigger debates in the courtroom, the 
media, Parliament, and elsewhere about the scope 
of the state’s responsibility to provide medicines in 
an equal and non-discriminatory manner. Uru-
guay is a party to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
which requires that the domestic interpretation 
and implementation of these rights be consistent 
with international guidelines. In this case study of 
Uruguay, we critically examine domestic case law 
to assess whether and how the judiciary interprets 
the government’s core obligations under the right 
to health. The results of our study may assist in 
current efforts to develop legislation concerning 
access to expensive medicines in Uruguay. It may 
also contribute evidence and analysis to the dearth 
of scholarly debate in the Uruguayan context of 
health rights litigation.
Uruguay
Uruguay became a democratic republic in 1984 fol-
lowing a period of civil-military rule. With a small 
but stable population of 3.44 million people, Uru-
guayans have a longer average life expectancy and 
lower rate of under-five child mortality than the 
Latin American and Caribbean regional averages.2 
Uruguay has been a high-income country since 
2012, with a gross national income of US$15,230 per 
capita per year in 2016 (compared to the regional 
average of US$8,252 per capita). Uruguay’s Human 
Development Index score increased from 0.692 
in 1990 to 0.795 in 2015 (out of 1.0), reflecting im-
provements to health and life expectancy, access to 
education and knowledge, and the overall standard 
of living.3
Access to medicines through national health 
insurance
In 1970, Uruguay ratified the ICESCR and, in doing 
so, committed to realizing the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health. In 2007, Uruguay’s 
National Health Insurance Scheme was introduced 
as part of a major health system reform grounded in 
the legal protection of the right to health and access 
to comprehensive health services.4 The reform con-
solidated various insurance financing instruments 
into the single National Health Fund (Fondo Nacio-
nal de Salud), financed by individual and employer 
contributions, as well as government funds.
The National Medicines Formulary (FTM 
by its Spanish initials) defines the pharmaceutical 
benefits package that must be universally available 
in the health system. It is updated by the Ministry 
of Public Health based on input from an expert ad-
visory committee that considers the World Health 
Organization’s Model List of Essential Medicines.5 
The FTM was updated in May 2011, August 2012, 
January and November 2013, and February 2015.6 
Domestic legislation enshrines the right to 
access licensed, quality-assured medicines that 
are included in the FTM.7 In practice, access to 
FTM medicines is granted through two insurance 
schemes. The first is the National Health Fund, 
which insures employees, the self-employed, and 
their families, who have access to the FTM package 
via a co-payment. The second is the Health Ser-
vices Administration, which covers the financially 
vulnerable, who have free-of-charge access to the 
FTM package.8 Annex I of the FTM includes the 
standard pharmaceutical package, while Annex III 
includes high-cost medicines and other expensive 
services. Annex III medicines are financed by the 
National Resource Fund (Fondo Nacional de Re-
cursos), which receives funding from a variety of 
sources, including the National Health Fund and 
the Ministry of Economy and Finance.9 Although 
91% of prescribed medicines in Uruguay are gener-
ics, spending on high-priced medicines through the 
National Resource Fund increased from US$2.74 
million in 2006 (0.01% of the gross domestic prod-
uct) to US$19.61 million in 2015 (0.06% of the gross 
domestic product).10
Judicialization of health rights
The judicialization of health is supported by the 
Uruguayan Constitution, which requires the state 
to provide the means for prevention and treatment 
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to “indigents” and those lacking sufficient financial 
resources.11 The right to health and other funda-
mental rights—such as the rights to life and to 
equality and non-discrimination—are justiciable 
before domestic courts.12 
Three features of the Uruguayan judicial 
system contribute to the complexity of health and 
medicines litigation. 
First, the writ of amparo is the judicial 
mechanism that claimants use in cases where a fun-
damental constitutional right is at immediate and 
significant risk. The urgency of the matter warrants 
an expedited hearing and decision within one week 
of filing, where the court must render a decision 
during the hearing (immediately after hearing the 
respondent’s arguments) or within 24 hours. This 
expedited proceeding—despite being a key tool to 
redress alleged human rights violations—restricts 
the thorough analysis that this topic merits.
Second, the Ministry of Public Health gen-
erally appeals decisions against it. Therefore, we 
assume that most medicines ordered by a court of 
first instance are ultimately decided by a higher 
court of appeal. 
Third, Uruguay’s civil legal system has seven 
circuits of appeal and is without binding precedents. 
Therefore, the result of an appeal will depend on the 
position adopted by each circuit in each individual 
case—different from, for example, Argentina’s col-
lective amparo. Each circuit is not bound by previous 
judgments—not even its own. Moreover, the courts 
have stated that all cases will be analyzed inde-
pendently given that, even though they may share 
certain characteristics, they are not identical.13 
Fourth, the inconsistency of the decisions of 
the appellate courts cannot be addressed by a high-
er court, as the Uruguayan system does not allow 
for another instance of judicial review for amparo 
cases. As a result, there is no legal mechanism to 
require or enforce a harmonized interpretation 
across courts.
Litigation for expensive medicines
Beginning in 2008, medicines litigation in Uruguay 
increased steadily, peaking in 2015 (see Figure 1). 
Such litigation often relates to high-priced med-
icines included in Annex III of the FTM.14 The 
Ministry of Public Health reports that court-or-
dered expenditure on medicines, which increased 
65% between 2010 and 2016, is likely to increase in-
equities in access to not only high-priced drugs but 
also basic health services across the population.15 
Moreover, the Ministry of Health spent US$5.3 
million providing court-ordered, high-cost medi-
cines in 2017.16 This unforeseen expenditure was in 
addition to the 9.2% of gross domestic product that 
Uruguay already spends on health.17 This evolution 
triggered several curious developments in domestic 
law and policy for pharmaceuticals.
First, the 2015–2019 national budget initially 
stated that the Uruguayan government would not 
be “responsible” for medicines and treatments 
excluded from the FTM.18 Following much debate, 
this article was later modified to read that the gov-
ernment would be responsible only for providing 
medicines of “proven effectiveness.” In this way, the 
national budget appealed to scientific criteria on 
“effectiveness” as a measure to discern which medi-
cines the state must provide, rather than leaving the 
matter to a case-by-case analysis.
Second, Ministerial Order 86/2015 of February 
2015 reiterated that an explicit list of pharmaceu-
ticals—including cetuximab, lenalidomide, and 
sorafenib—were considered cost-ineffective for 
specific cancers and consequently would not be 
included in the FTM for these indications.19 Curi-
ously, decisions granting some of these medicines 
to plaintiffs continued throughout 2015 and 2016.20 
Third, the Ministry of Public Health created 
a new administrative procedure as an alternative 
to the courts for patients seeking access to off-for-
mulary medicines.21 This procedure was introduced 
to stem the number amparo claims; however, it has 
been criticized as laborious and requiring substan-
tial documentation.22
Despite these measures, amparo claims for 
medicines continued. In 2016, court-ordered med-
icines consumed 25% of the Ministry of Public 
Health’s operating expenses.23 Currently, legislation 
is being developed to improve access to expensive 
medicines; however, there is a critical lack of anal-
ysis of these amparo claims to inform lawmakers. 
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Specifically, there has been little exploration of 
whether the courts adequately interpret the state’s 
core obligations to provide essential medicines and 
ensure non-discriminatory access in line with the 
right to health in the ICESCR.
Methods
Using the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ authoritative interpre-
tation of the right to health in General Comment 14 
as its normative framework (described below), our 
study reviews domestic case law concerning access 
to medicines. It critically examines how Uruguayan 
courts determine the scope and boundaries of the 
state’s action in light of two core obligations under 
the right to health in the ICESCR. 
We selected amparo cases decided in 2015—
the year with the most medicines-related decisions 
since the 2006 health reform. This method offers a 
snapshot of judicial reasoning at the peak of phar-
maceutical claims and in the period coinciding 
and immediately following a series of legislative 
changes that were designed to curb amparo cases 
for medicines.
Cases were retrieved from the online reposi-
tory of the Uruguayan national judiciary using the 
keywords “acceso” and “medicamento.” Only cases 
claiming access to a pharmaceutical intervention 
through a writ of amparo were included. 
We extracted key features of each case into 
a database for further analysis. These features in-
clude the medication and indication requested, the 
factual and legal basis of the plaintiff’s claim, the 


















Source: Base de Jurisprudencia Nacional Pública, http://bjn.poderjudicial.gub.uy/BJNPUBLICA/busquedaSimple.seam>
Figure 1. Evolution of amparo claims for medicines in Uruguay, 2007–2016
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Analytical framework
Our analytical framework is founded on states’ 
core obligations to realize the right to health, iden-
tified in General Comment 14, which was issued 
in 2000 by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. States’ non-derogable core 
obligations to realize the right to health form the 
basic minimum floor of the right on which all other 
aspects should be built.24 Core obligations include 
the duty to provide essential medicines, as defined 
by the World Health Organization (WHO), and the 
duty to ensure access to health facilities, goods, and 
services on a non-discriminatory basis.25
First, we examine whether Uruguayan courts 
have addressed the duty to provide essential 
medicines in a manner consistent with General 
Comment 14. Essential medicines are defined by 
WHO as effective, safe, and comparatively cost-ef-
fective to treat the priority health conditions of a 
population.26 Every two years, WHO updates its 
Model List of Essential Medicines, which serves 
as a guide for domestic governments in their de-
velopment of local and national lists of essential 
medicines that respond to local contingencies, such 
as available public resources and disease burden. In 
recent years, highly effective and expensive med-
icines for HIV, hepatitis C infections, and some 
cancers were added to the WHO model list despite 
their high price. This move proved that high cost 
as such does not preclude essentiality; instead, it 
confirmed the message from WHO’s definition 
that essential medicines, once selected, must be-
come affordable for all who require them.27 In the 
Uruguayan context, the entire FTM (Annexes I 
and III) is compiled with a comparable objective 
and according to similar criteria as an essential 
medicines list. Therefore, the FTM can be consid-
ered the national list of essential medicines in the 
Uruguayan context.
Second, we investigate whether the courts 
address the core obligation to ensure the right of 
access to health facilities, goods, and services on a 
non-discriminatory basis in line with guidance in 
General Comment 14. According to this general 
comment, the state has a duty “to prevent any dis-
crimination on internationally prohibited grounds 
in the provision of health care and health services, 
especially with respect to the core obligations of the 
right to health.”28 It warns against “inappropriate 
health resource allocation” that may lead to discrete 
discrimination. It offers the example of favoring 
“expensive curative health services which are often 
accessible only to a small, privileged fraction of 
the population, rather than primary and preven-
tive health care benefiting a far larger part of the 
population.”29 Moreover, it notes that the state has 
a “special obligation” to provide health insurance 
and care to those with insufficient means.30 This 
duty is closely related to the universal entitlement 
to “a system of health protection which provides 
equality of opportunity” such that people can enjoy 
their health rights.31
Results
Of the 52 claims decided in 2015 that were avail-
able in the judicial repository, 10 were excluded (3 
claimed medical devices as opposed to pharma-
ceuticals, and 7 were not amparo cases), leaving 42 
claims that were included in this study (see Table 
1). Each of these claims sought one pharmaceutical. 
Of the 42 claims, 31 (74%) were decided in favor of 
the plaintiff (hereafter “successful claims”).
Thirty-four claims (81%) accounted for 10 medi-
cines (see Table 2). Requests were most frequently for 
licensed medicines not included in the FTM (hereaf-
ter “off-formulary”). Eight claims (19%) successfully 
acquired the off-formulary medicines cetuximab, 
lenalidomide, and sorafenib for cost-ineffective indi-
cations that were explicitly excluded from the FTM 
by Ministerial Order 86/2015.32 The courts denied 
two claims for unlicensed medicines and accepted 
the only request for an on-formulary medicine. 
Duty to provide essential medicines
In cases requesting off-formulary medicines, the 
courts produced vague and sometimes contra-
dictory evaluations of alleged violations of the 
fundamental right to health. For example, one court 
granted reimbursement of off-formulary medicines 
despite “bureaucratic reasons” for not adding the 
medicines to the list (for example, passage of the 
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Categories Number of successful 
claims (n=31) 





(% of unsuccessful 
claims)
Essentiality • In WHO’s 2017 Model List of Essential Medicines
• In the National Medicines Formulary (FTM) for any indication
2 (6%)                                  
5 (16%)
1 (9%)                            
2 (18%) 
Indications • Oncological diseases
• Unspecified indication(s)
• Idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (degenerative lung disease)
• Nephrotic syndrome
• Lupus

















recognized in the 
court decisions
• Right to life
• Right to an adequate standard of living and health
• Right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health
• Right to freedom from discrimination
• Right to equality before the law














recognized in the 
court decisions
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
• American Convention on Human Rights 
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights












Table 1. Characteristics of 42 amparo claims decided by Uruguayan circuits of appeal in 2015
Medicine Number of claims 
(% of total)






Abiraterone acetate 4 (10%) • Prostate cancer 4 0









Lenalidomide 3 (7%) • Multiple myeloma 3 0
Regorafenib 4 (10%) • Colon/colorectal cancer** 3 1
Pirfenidone 3 (7%) • Pulmonary fibrosis 2 1






Paclitaxel 2 (5%) • Pancreatic cancer** 2 0






TDM-1 (trastuzumab-emitansine) 3 (7%) • Unspecified











Table 2. The 10 most frequently claimed medicines in 2015
** Includes both metastatic (advanced) and non-metastatic disease because the court decisions did not systematically differentiate between the two 
stages of the same pathology. 
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annual submission deadline to the advisory com-
mittee or insufficient time to complete the technical 
appraisal of a medicine for inclusion). However, in 
three other cases, the courts reasoned that an on-
going assessment or insufficient time to evaluate 
cost-effectiveness justified not reimbursing the 
medicine at that time. The latter three decisions are 
consistent with the core obligation to provide es-
sential medicines, which presupposes that sufficient 
information and time has been given to adequately 
assess the essentiality of each medicine—an imper-
ative step for inclusion in the FTM. 
Similar inconsistencies are evident in de-
cisions not to reimburse a high-priced medicine 
in light of limited public funds, which the courts 
interpreted as a breach of fundamental rights in 
six cases. However, in four other cases, the courts 
reasoned that not reimbursing expensive medicines 
due to limited resources or their lack of cost-effec-
tiveness was consistent with fundamental rights. 
The former decisions are consistent with the con-
cept of non-derogable core obligations in General 
Comment 14. The four latter cases reflect a softer 
approach to core obligations, which is addressed 
further in the Discussion section below.
Two similar claims for cetuximab demon-
strate this inconsistent reasoning. Cetuximab’s 
reported price for colon cancer is US$190,483 per 
patient per year.33 Excluded from the FTM due to its 
cost-ineffectiveness, cetuximab was claimed twice 
in our 2015 sample for the treatment of metastatic 
colon cancer. In the first case, decided on October 
10, 2015, Circuit 7 determined that there was no 
scientific justification for excluding cetuximab for 
this indication. In reaching this conclusion, the 
court reasoned that a lack of cost-effectiveness did 
not justify denying reimbursement to a patient who 
could not otherwise afford it.34 However, in the 
second case, decided on November 3, 2015, Circuit 
5 decided that it must respect the decision to omit 
cetuximab for this indication from the FTM on 
economic grounds. In this court’s appreciation, 
this decision was consistent with the patient’s fun-
damental rights and previous court rulings.35
Duty to ensure non-discriminatory access to 
health care
Uruguayan courts conceptualize equality and 
non-discrimination in two different ways, leading 
to two significantly different results. 
On one hand, successful cases have general-
ly found a breach of the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination on two grounds. First, some 
courts consider that the positive market authoriza-
tion decision and negative reimbursement decision 
(in other words, exclusion from the FTM) regarding 
certain high-priced medicines breaches the right to 
equality and non-discrimination. This is because 
authorization without reimbursement allows access 
for those who can afford the medicines but not for 
those without the financial means and who are lim-
ited to the FTM selection. The reasoning is based on 
the idea that “every patient has the right to access 
medicines of quality, and the constitutional protec-
tion of this right does not distinguish whether these 
medicines are or are not included in the FTM.”36 In 
the words of Circuit 7 “The effective protection of 
the right to life or health cannot depend … on one’s 
financial ability or privileged situation that enables 
them to access the medical treatment.”37 According 
to this line of decisions, “economic accessibility” 
shall be guaranteed by the state through the pro-
vision of all medicines, irrespective of their cost or 
their inclusion in the FTM.38 The courts’ notion of 
providing for those who cannot provide for them-
selves appears to align with the right to health’s 
concept of equality of opportunity. However, the 
state is not obliged to provide immediate access 
to health services of any cost to those dependent 
on state health care. Moreover, General Comment 
14 cautions states against discrimination that can 
result from providing expensive curative care to the 
few at the expense of preventative and primary care 
for the many.
Second, courts have generally been receptive 
to the argument that since both the Health Ser-
vices Administration (health insurance for the 
financially vulnerable) and the Ministry of Public 
Health may have provided a particular medicine 
to other patients who have requested it previously, 
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not granting a plaintiff’s request would breach the 
principle of equality enshrined in article 8 of the 
Uruguayan Constitution. This is because other 
patients with similar conditions have been granted 
access to the medicine in question (either by judi-
cial or administrative action). The courts consider 
that the Ministry of Public Health decides these 
issues in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner 
that breaches the right to equality. They conclude 
that the use of public resources cannot discriminate 
between citizens and that the Ministry of Public 
Health does not have a valid reason to justify the 
difference in treatment. 
On the other hand, the courts have also used 
the argument of equality in their decisions not to 
grant a plaintiff’s request. These decisions sustain 
that the government has limited resources to attend 
to the health care needs of the whole population 
and that the provision of certain high-priced med-
icines can clash with the needs of the rest of the 
population. For example, Circuit 6 has argued that 
“the primary obligation of the Ministry of Public 
Health is to attend to the general welfare applying 
the principle of equality, not just for one patient but 
for everybody”.39 Along the same lines, Circuit 5 has 
viewed plaintiffs’ requests as a demand for special 
treatment “at a high cost and over the needs of the 
rest of the population”.40 This reasoning is some-
what consistent with the concept of “inappropriate 
health resource allocation” in General Comment 
14. Circuit 5 has pointed out that “even when the 
condition of the patient is grave—unfortunately—
this is not the only person that needs to be assisted 
… That is the key issue here”.41 This argument 
points to the fact that increased judicialization dis-
torts health planning and priority setting, forcing 
decisions that reflect on the individual cases being 
judged and not on society’s collective needs. The 
courts emphasize the fact that decisions regarding 
health policies—which require the consideration 
of multiple factors—should be made by the exec-
utive branch. Judicial intervention to grant access 
to high-priced medicines—without a grave cause 
to justify it—can endanger the general well-being 
of the population by distorting the national health 
budget. According to this approach, “[j]udges need 
to be guided by the law and what is just, not only for 
the plaintiff but for others and society as a whole”.42 
It has been argued that deciding otherwise will 
turn the courts into a “judicial pharmacy”.43
Discussion
The majority of the claims in our sample concerned 
one of ten off-formulary medicines frequently 
requested to treat cancer. The courts provided in-
consistent and unreliable legal reasoning in their 
decisions for the protection of the right to health. 
Our study shows that the courts’ reasoning neither 
implicitly nor explicitly engages with the concept 
of core obligations to provide essential medicines 
in a non-discriminatory manner. Although some 
decisions are consistent with the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ interpre-
tation of core obligations, we cannot determine 
whether these were conscious or coincidental judi-
cial rulings. 
These findings illustrate that Uruguayan case 
law from 2015 fails to provide any legal certainty re-
garding the boundaries of the state’s core obligation 
to provide essential medicines in a non-discrimi-
natory manner. Due to a lack of consistency, these 
decisions may further exacerbate, rather than rem-
edy, inequalities among patients with comparable 
health needs and within the publicly funded phar-
maceutical reimbursement system as a whole.44 
A softer approach to core obligations in 
international human rights law
A more flexible approach to minimum core obli-
gations seems to be condoned in the 2013 Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR (hereafter ICESCR-OP), 
inspired by the 2000 Grootboom and 2001 Treat-
ment Action Campaign decisions of the South 
African Constitutional Court.45 ICESCR-OP is the 
first instrument to enable the international enforce-
ment of the rights laid out in the ICESCR. It adopts 
a standard of reasonableness suggesting that social 
rights realization is contingent on an assessment of 
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whether the state has taken sufficiently appropriate 
measures to realize the right within its maximum 
resource limits. As Bruce Porter explains: 
Reasonableness is a contextual inquiry into 
the content of Covenant rights in particular 
circumstances, attending equally to both the 
voice and experiences of claimants, and to the 
realities, restraints, and difficult choices faced by 
governments. What is reasonable will depend as 
much on the nature of the interest at stake and the 
unique circumstances of the particular claimant 
or group, as on budgetary constraints, competing 
needs and policy rationale presented by the state.46
By ratifying the ICESCR-OP in 2013, Uruguay 
expressly agreed to be held accountable before an 
international committee to the instrument’s stan-
dards and principles, such as the nascent concept 
of reasonableness.
The standard of reasonableness: A measure of 
state action for the Uruguayan judiciary? 
Our results show that despite considering the con-
textual needs and restraints of the plaintiff and the 
state in each decision, the Uruguayan judiciary has 
not applied a common measure to judge state action. 
One of the present authors (Katrina Perehudoff) 
and Lisa Forman propose that the standard of rea-
sonableness, found in South African jurisprudence 
and the ICESCR-OP, may serve as a lens through 
which we can interpret core obligations. In other 
words, the standard of reasonableness can help 
give substance to the state’s duty to use all avail-
able resources to satisfy its core obligations toward 
essential medicines.47 In particular, Perehudoff and 
Forman suggest that satisfying core obligations in 
the context of available resources can be delineated 
into four duties: (1) ensure sufficient government 
spending on pharmaceuticals, (2) ensure efficient 
spending on pharmaceuticals, (3) generate effi-
ciencies by seeking international cooperation and 
assistance, and (4) observe non-discrimination in 
pharmaceutical policy.48 Uruguayan lawmakers 
could be expected to align the domestic interpre-
tation and enforcement of social rights with the 
international standards to which the Uruguayan 
state has agreed to be accountable.
In the case of Uruguay, we assert that the 
judiciary could seek inspiration from the standard 
of reasonableness to assess claims for high-priced 
medicines. An examination of core obligations 
consistent with the standard of reasonableness 
would assess whether the state had taken all “rea-
sonable” measures to provide the medicine before 
determining whether the state violated rights.
Let us take a look at the three claims for 
lenalidomide identified in our study in order to 
illustrate an alternate line of judicial assessment 
inspired by the standard of reasonableness. The 
Ministry of Public Health determined in 2013 that 
lenalidomide is cost-ineffective for the second-line 
treatment of multiple myeloma and, consequently, 
did not include the medicine in the FTM. However, 
the health technology assessment notes that a 70% 
price reduction would render lenalidomide suffi-
ciently cost-effective for FTM inclusion.49 In 2015, 
we found that three patients who claimed lenalid-
omide were granted court-ordered reimbursement 
for multiple myeloma despite it being off-formulary 
for this indication. In each of these cases, the courts 
determined that failing to reimburse a high-priced 
medicine that is proven effective for a life-threat-
ening condition on the grounds of limited state 
resources violates the rights to life, health, and 
non-discrimination.50 
Uruguayan scholars note that in response 
to high-priced medicines, price regulation and 
international cooperation for joint purchasing 
and price transparency is being pursued in Uru-
guay.51 Therefore, the courts could have considered 
whether similar measures were pursued in relation 
to lenalidomide prior to deciding in the plaintiffs’ 
favor. Recalling the four duties proposed by Pere-
hudoff and Forman, this line of reasoning could 
have examined whether the state took measures to 
maximize its public pharmaceutical budget (duty 
1) and spend efficiently (duty 2), such as through 
the use of price controls and TRIPS flexibilities 
when all other measures fail to yield affordable 
medicines.52 Sufficient and efficient spending can 
mitigate the need for discriminatory trade-offs and 
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care rationing (duty 4).53 Finally, the court could 
have questioned whether the state took steps to 
jointly procure medicines with larger neighboring 
countries (duty 3) in order to leverage economies 
of scale. By examining the “reasonableness” of state 
efforts to fulfill Uruguay’s core obligations, the ju-
diciary could have secured more equitable access to 
lenalidomide for the plaintiffs while also triggering 
important policy changes that would grant access 
to the other invisible patients with multiple my-
eloma who did not file a writ of amparo, while still 
respecting the separation of powers. 
Does litigation stimulate rather than remedy 
health inequality?
This “wave” of litigation since Uruguay’s health 
reform is likely to have affected equity in the coun-
try’s tax-funded universal health system in several 
ways. First, not all consumers with unmet health 
needs are equally able to access a court. This con-
cern is corroborated by government representatives 
who claim that health rights litigation may result 
in preferential access for people of higher socio-
economic status.54 Second, successful plaintiffs 
inevitably receive and consume more health system 
resources than those who do not seek treatment 
through the courts.55 Third, these challenges are 
compounded by inconsistent judicial outcomes in 
highly similar cases. 
Uruguayan case law in our sample provided 
little information about the plaintiffs’ socioeco-
nomic status. Therefore, we are unable to assess 
whether litigation is exacerbating inequalities by 
providing preferential reimbursement of medicines 
to the better-off, as has been reported elsewhere in 
the region.56 However, the question of inequality 
warrants further research in Uruguay considering 
the above factors at play. 
Access to the courts for people who cannot 
afford a lawyer is stimulated through several ini-
tiatives of the law clinics of the Universidad de la 
República (a public university). However, securing 
representation by these clinics is limited by their 
case load and by patients’ ability to travel to the capi-
tal city in order to access the clinics’ services. While 
the clinics’ work may palliate inequalities in access 
to the courts, unless all health consumers have the 
same political and economic resources, certain 
groups are more likely to be able to litigate—and 
therefore access high-priced drugs—more effec-
tively than others. Considering that socioeconomic 
status is not only one of the most prominent social 
determinants of health but also an important indi-
cator of one’s ability to access the courts, we must 
agree with Octavio Ferraz that “the ability to access 
the judiciary is not a fair criterion for the allocation 
of health resources.”57 
Domestic policy recommendations
Two key policy recommendations arise from these 
findings. First, the Uruguayan state should consider 
legislative measures to control the prices of expen-
sive medicines that would otherwise be eligible for 
inclusion in the FTM if it were not for their pro-
hibitive price. In this line, a bill is currently being 
debated in Parliament to provide tax cuts to private 
companies that donate to the National Resource 
Fund, which finances expensive medicines.58 At the 
time of writing, it is unclear whether the bill will be 
adopted. In July 2017, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights urged the country to ac-
celerate the passing of this bill in order to guarantee 
access to all medicines needed to enjoy the right to 
health.59 While the bill is an attempt to expand the 
available budget for and access to expensive med-
icines, it does not address the underlying reasons 
for high prices and the use of all available means 
of reducing prices as recommended by the Lancet’s 
Commission on Essential Medicines Policies.60 This 
fragmented approach gives in to the lobbying pow-
er of pharmaceutical companies that will benefit 
from tax cuts for donating money to the National 
Resource Fund while having their high-priced 
medicines be included in the FTM. In principle, 
donations are not recommended as a means for 
improving access to high-priced products, as they 
allow pharmaceutical companies to maintain the 
underlying high prices.
We recommend that if the political climate 
allows for a legislative solution, Uruguay should 
pursue a more holistic law that regulates and 
supports all possible price control measures and 
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promotes international cooperation to evaluate and 
purchase medicines. Moreover, a more transparent 
and participatory process to establish the criteria for 
inclusion in the FTM would also foster open public 
debate and a deeper public understanding of the 
issues at play.61 Technical decisions about whether 
to include new medicines in the FTM should be 
objective, consistent, and evidence based. Failing 
to take measures such as these to make essential 
medicines affordable to all is inconsistent with the 
right to health.62 
Second, alternative approaches to the writ of 
amparo are needed. Uruguay should also allow for 
another instance of judicial review that harmonizes 
the inconsistent decisions on appeal. Such an alter-
native approach should ensure that all courts of 
appeal interpret the law in a uniform manner, which 
would help reduce disparate judicial outcomes in 
highly similar cases. Alternative approaches may 
be found in neighboring countries that also face 
numerous judicial claims for medicines.
Study limitations
The limitations of our study relate to the accessi-
bility and completeness of data in court decisions. 
First, our search of the official online repository 
produced only 52 decisions from 2015, while Uru-
guayan scholars report retrieving 80 such decisions 
for the same year.63 We consulted one of these 
scholars, and although both of our research teams 
reported inconsistencies in the repository’s search 
function, neither team could identify a solution. We 
could not access a list of the 80 medicines decisions, 
and time restraints precluded a manual search of 
the repository. Therefore, we proceeded with this 
convenience sample of 52 decisions. Although we 
cannot claim that our sample is representative of 
all medicines claims from 2015, it does represent 
the decisions that are most readily accessible to the 
Uruguayan judiciary, which uses the same online 
repository to access case law. We hypothesize that 
judges and their teams are most likely to consult 
case law that is the easiest to access, especially con-
sidering that the courts of appeal hear and decide 
amparo claims for medicines within one week of 
filing. Moreover, selection bias favoring claims for 
high-cost, off-formulary medicines in our sample 
is unlikely because the Ministry of Public Health 
tends to appeal all decisions against it. This means 
that if a court of first instance ordered the minis-
try to reimburse an on-formulary medicine, then 
the government would appeal the decision, which 
would then be heard by a court of appeal and there-
fore appear in our sample. 
Second, several court decisions contained 
little to no information about the pathologies that 
the medicine in question was requested to treat (see 
the five cases with an “unspecified” indication in 
Table 2). As a result, our finding that courts rule 
inconsistently on the same indication may be more 
frequent than we documented.
Third, the fact that General Comment 14 is 
not binding on states could call into question its 
legitimacy as an analytical framework. Never-
theless, this general comment is an authoritative 
interpretation of the right to health in the ICESCR. 
It instructs state parties on their goals and ac-
tions required to attain the right to health for all; 
it also reflects the monitoring criteria applied by 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. General Comment 14 is also instructive for 
domestic law and policymaking, being explicitly 
and implicitly referenced in national medicines 
policies, domestic health legislation, and medicines 
case law from various jurisdictions.64 From these 
examples, we can conclude that General Comment 
14 is the most authoritative human rights guide for 
domestic health law and policymaking despite the 
fact that it does not reflect all aspects of a public 
health or health systems approach. 
Conclusion
Our findings show that Uruguayan case law 
concerning high-priced medicines fails to offer pre-
dictable legal argumentation among the country’s 
seven circuits of appeal. Nor does this body of case 
law provide an interpretation of state obligations 
that is consistently aligned with the right to health in 
the ICESCR. While medicines litigation in Uruguay 
offers relief for some individual claims, the courts’ 
inconsistent legal reasoning has the potential to ex-
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acerbate systemic inequalities by failing to address 
the structural problems behind high medicines pric-
es. In response, future court rulings should embrace 
a consistent standard for examining state action to 
realize the right to health within its available re-
sources. Furthermore, future legislative responses 
should address the need for medicines price control 
and offer a harmonized interpretation of these rights 
and obligations. These steps will increase the trans-
parency and predictability of Uruguay’s health and 
legal systems for patients. 
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